Abstract
Introduction
Since the work of Sen (1976) , taking into account inequality among the poor, and not solely the incidence or average intensity of poverty, has become common scientific practice and has generated a considerable literature 1 . Alongside this has grown a belief among several researchers and policy analysts that concerns of relativity were also important in assessing poverty lines. In the words of Townsend (1979) , a well-known proponent of that relativist view:
"Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the type of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities." (p. 31) The link between poverty and relative exclusion from society also transpires from the official use of the concept of social exclusion in the European Commission, where it is defined "in relation to the social rights of citizens (...) to participation in the major social and occupational opportunities of the society." (Room (1992), p.14) On his part, Sen believes that comparing poverty across distributions may involve "different standards of minimum necessities" (1981, p.21) and "that absolute deprivation in terms of a person's capabilities relates to relative deprivation in terms of commodities, incomes and resources" (1984, p.326 ). This view is somewhat supported by the large number of cross-country comparisons using proportions of median or mean incomes as poverty lines. Another link between poverty and relativity is the frequent normalisation of poverty indices by possibly different poverty lines (see, for instance, Foster et al. (1984) ), which typically leads to "relative poverty indices" as defined in Blackorby and Donaldson (1980) . Foster and Shorrocks (1988) , Foster and Sen (1997) and Davidson and Duclos (1998) show how such normalisation links relative poverty and relative inequality comparisons. Finally, having identified the poor and measured the respective intensity of their poverty, individual poverty is usually aggregated into global poverty indices, and "in the 'aggregation' exercise the magnitudes of absolute deprivation may have to be supplemented by 1 considerations of relative deprivation" (Sen (1981) ,p.32).
Among all these links between poverty, inequality and exclusion, it is on the one between poverty and relative deprivation in the latter "aggregation exercise" that we wish to focus particularly in this paper 2 . We will do this by developing a class of poverty indices which combine concerns of absolute deprivation and of relative deprivation. Absolute deprivation is undoubtedly "an irreducible core (...) in our idea of poverty, which translates reports of starvation, malnutrition and visible hardship onto a diagnosis of poverty" (Sen (1981) , p.17). Although sometimes neglected by economists, relative deprivation has been linked to "definable and measurable social and psychological reactions, such as different types of alienation" (Durant and Christian (1990) , p.210) by social psychologists and to social protests, discrimination, feelings of injustice and subjective ill-being (Olson (1986) ). It has also been used to interpret measures of inequality and income redistribution (see for instance Yitzhaki (1979) and Duclos (1999) ).
The class of poverty indices we consider in this paper is a generalisation of the Sen(1976)-Thon(1979)-Chakravarty(1983)-Shorrocks(1995) indices of poverty. The indices depend upon an ethical parameter which captures the sensitivity of poverty measurement to "exclusion" or "relativedeprivation" aversion. The greater the value of , the greater the weight assigned to relative deprivation as against absolute deprivation in measuring and comparing poverty.
The next section sets up the basic definitions and shows the link between generalised Gini indices and relative deprivation, upon which our subsequent work draws. Section 3 then shows how our class of poverty indices can be understood as a weighted sum of absolute and relative deprivation. It also points to the indices' useful and simple graphical interpretation as weighted areas underneath cumulative poverty gap (CPG) curves, and indicates how they can be used to assess the impact of growth on poverty and for decomposition analyses. Section 4 illustrates some of the results using Luxembourg Income Study data drawn from 4 countries. For a reasonable common poverty line, we find that, whatever the percentiles considered, the United States have more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium, but that the relative deprivation curve for Italy crosses that of the three other countries. Moreover, for all but one of the six possible country comparisons, it is not possible to make unambiguous robust poverty orderings based on CPG curves. Since absolute deprivation and mean poverty are very similar in the four countries, we thus find that unambiguous poverty comparisons would inevitably depend on the importance granted to concerns over relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is also seen to depend on the presence of and on concerns for relative deprivation: in pairwise comparisons, poverty is least responsive to growth in the USA and in Denmark, which is also where relative deprivation is the greatest. The last section concludes our paper.
Inequality and relative deprivation
Consider the cumulative distribution of income ¡ £ ¢ with support contained in the nonnegative real line. Let a poverty line be denoted by
. 3 The next most popular poverty index after the headcount is given by ¥ U T , the average poverty gap in the population:
Hence, if perfect targetting of the poor were possible, ¥ c T would give the per capita expenditures which the state would need to spend in order to eradicate poverty completely. Clearly, and as we will discuss more later, ¥ U T does not give any ethical or normative weight to inequality in the distribution of the poverty gaps.
Let the cumulative poverty gap (CPG) curve be defined as 4 :
. As can be seen on the Figure, has everywhere a greater average poverty gap whatever the percentage of the poorest part of the population considered.
has also more inequality among its poor than (for which all poor have the same incomes, as can be seen from the initial straight line segment).
has nevertheless a lower headcount than . In determining which of or has more poverty, there may therefore exist a trade-off between the number of the poor (the "incidence" of poverty , as shown in Jenkins and Lambert (1997) and in Shorrocks (1998) . Let be the class of poverty indices that are replication invariant, increasing and Schur-convex in
A useful tool for capturing the inequality in the distribution of poverty gaps is the Lorenz curve of the distribution of censored incomes, defined as
is the mean of the distribution of censored incomes. This allows us to decompose the CPG curve into components due to the mean and to the inequality of poverty gaps: Hence, the value of d § ©
can be split in two parts, mean deprivation (A) and "excess" deprivation due to inequality of poverty (B), as shown in Figure 2 . As Figure 2 also suggests, we will see later that this decomposition gives rise respectively to absolute and relative deprivation.
To capture inequality of poverty in an aggregate index, first recall that the Gini index of inequality is given by :
The Gini index is thus the average distance between population shares and income shares of various possible proportions (between 0 and 1) of the poorer in a population. A well-known single-parameter generalisation of the Gini (or "s-Gini" 6 ) is obtained by applying the normative weights
between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve:
, no weight is attached to inequality, and
indices are thus an ethically weighted sum of absolute and relative deprivation. Absolute deprivation is the average shortfall (HI) from the poverty line. Relative deprivation is the ethically weighted average shortfall from the incomes of others 9 . As noted above, this concept is linked to the current widespread concern for social exclusion, which, as Silver (1994, p.557) remarks, entails "the drawing of inappropriate group distinctions between free and equal individuals which deny access to or participation in exchange or interaction", including participation in the socially perceived minimum consumption level. When
¦ ¬ A
, no account is taken of relative deprivation in the computation of the poverty index. The higher the value of , the more important is relative deprivation in assessing poverty, and the more important is the relative deprivation of the most excluded in assessing overall relative deprivation.
can then be usefully seen as an "exclusion-aversion" sensitivity parameter. indices 9 Note that these comparison incomes are censored at the poverty line. This censoring of reference incomes at the poverty line can nevertheless be justified by the view of Runciman (1966, p.29) that "people often choose reference groups closer to their actual circumstances than those which might be forced on them if their opportunities were better than they are". With that view, we may think of the poor as referring to the rich as not being in poverty, and thus to their incomes as not being below the poverty line.
of poverty would fall if all incomes rose by one dollar (following, say, a uniform fall in a poll tax or an increase in a lump-sum transfer), or if all incomes increased by the same proportion (following, say, a surge in some inequality-neutral economic growth). These changes in poverty can in particular guide the design of subsidies or transfer targetting, in the manner of Besley and Kanbur (1988) for instance. For this purpose, we define . For a uniform per capita marginal income change, a °
, we then find that
Equation § p p © is straightforward to compute since it only requires the headcount, the poverty line and the ethical parameter . The greater the focus on the poorest (when is large), the greater the change in deprivation since the increase in°is then deemed to be more effective. The increase in income for those above the poverty line has indeed no effect on deprivation, absolute or relative, and this is seen as wasted when relative deprivation and ethical focus on the poorest are given little weight in assessing poverty.
For a proportional marginal change indices not decomposable in the sense indicated above.
The property of separability is not, however, as desirable as is sometimes suggested in the literature. It is unlikely for instance that in comparing themselves with others, individuals confine themselves to tight socio-economic groups. Instead, if concerns of relativity ought to scan the whole distribution of income to be relevant for the measurement of poverty, then separability is clearly not a desirable property for a poverty index. Hence, we would not wish a change in the distribution of incomes in a group to leave poverty unaltered in another group if assessments of relative deprivation must be made taking into account the whole population, and not a single subgroup. Or, to paraphase Sen (1973, p.41) , "if one feels that the social valuation of the welfare of individuals should depend crucially on the levels of welfare (or incomes) of others, this property of the independence of each person's welfare component from the position of others [in other subgroups] has to be sacrificed."
To see how to decompose
An illustration using LIS data
To illustrate some of the above relations, we use data drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 10 data sets of Belgium and Denmark (1992 data) and of Italy and the USA (1991 data). These two pairs of countries were partly selected because of the interesting features they exhibit in poverty comparisons, as will become clearer later. The raw data were treated in the same manner as in Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) , and yielded household disposable income (i.e., post-tax-and-transfer income) expressed in 1991 adult-equivalent $ US 11 . The reference poverty line was set at $7000 in 1991 adult-equivalent US dollars, which appeared to be a reasonable baseline for poverty comparisons across industrialised countries, and which is also approximately the 1991 American poverty line for single individuals. 12 Finally, for the purposes of our illustrations, we do not present here standard errors for our various estimates, although it is clear that some of the crosscountry comparisons discussed below are not statistically significant 13 . Table 1 shows the headcounts for the 4 countries mentioned above at poverty lines of US$7000 and slightly above. Italy has by far the most poverty by this standard, followed by the United States, Belgium and Denmark. The first column of Table 2 shows the § A h © values for the same countries at
, which is simply the average poverty gap ¥ U T
. Unlike the poverty headcounts, the average poverty gaps (and thus absolute deprivation) are very similar poverty in Belgium and in Denmark, and in Italy and in the USA respectively. It will thus be interesting to check if relative deprivation is sufficiently different across these countries to affect cross-country comparisons. Figure 3 shows how individual relative deprivations vary across different quantiles for each of the four countries. The United States show more relative deprivation than Belgium and Denmark whatever the 10 See http://lissy.ceps.lu for detailed information on the structure of these data. 11 We apply purchasing power parities drawn from the Penn World Tables (see Summers and Heston (1991) for the methodology underlying the computation of these parities, and http://www.nber.org/pwt56.html for access to the 1991 figures) to convert national currencies into 1991 US dollars. As in Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), we divide household income by an adultequivalence scale defined as
, where Â is household size, so as to allow comparisons of the welfare of individuals living in households of different sizes. Hence, all incomes are transformed into 1991 adult-equivalent $US. All household observations are also weighted by the LIS sample weights "hweight" times the number of persons in the household. Finally, negative incomes are set to 0.quantiles considered. The Italian relative deprivation profile crosses that of the four other countries. This also says that although mean absolute deprivation is substantially greater in Italy than in Denmark or in Belgium, for individuals towards the bottom of the income distributions, relative deprivation does not differ by much (and can in fact be greater in Denmark than in Italy). The indices for various values of the ethical parameter . This is shown in Table 2 , with aggregate relative deprivation indicated in parentheses. For equal to 2,3 and 4, poverty is lower in Belgium than in Denmark, Italy or the United States, and Danish poverty is lower than in Italy and the United States (as was expected from the ranking of the CPG curves). The comparisons of Italian and American poverty depend on and thus on the importance given to relative deprivation in measuring poverty. For the headcount and for absolute deprivation, Italy has more poverty than the US, but when sufficient weight is given to relative deprivation (for % S p for instance), poverty in the US becomes significantly greater. Figures 5 and 6 show graphically how the indices change with variations in and marginal changes in ¤ . Figure 5 confirms that at a poverty line of $7000, Denmark always has more poverty than Belgium, whatever the value of , since it has both more absolute deprivation and generally more individual relative deprivation whatever the percentile considered (recall Figure  3) . When the poverty line increases up to $7500, however, Belgium starts to have higher absolute deprivation, and it is then only with suitably high weights on the relative deprivation of the poor that Belgian poverty can still be considered lower than the Danish one. Similar remarks apply to the com-
Conclusion
Our paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussing on a class of poverty indices which aggregate concerns of absolute deprivation and relative deprivation. The indices depend upon an ethical parameter which captures the ethical sensitivity of poverty measurement to "exclusion" or "relative-deprivation" aversion. We show that the indices equal the sum of mean absolute deprivation and of an ethically weighted mean of the individual relative deprivation found among the poor. The greater the value of , the greater the weight assigned to relative deprivation as against absolute deprivation in measuring and comparing poverty. We also show how the indices can be easily used to assess the impact of growth on poverty. Our illustrative section reports that, for a reasonable common poverty line, the United States have more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever the percentiles considered. For comparisons of total deprivation, however, it is not possible to order these countries robustly. Since absolute deprivation is very similar in the four countries considered, poverty comparisons across them will inevitably depend on the importance granted to concerns over relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is also seen to depend on the presence of and on concerns over relative deprivation: in pairwise comparisons of Italy and the US and of Belgium and Denmark, poverty is much less responsive to growth in the USA and in Denmark, which is also where relative deprivation is generally found to be the greatest. 
